Норвел Де Аткинс, полковник армии США в отставке. Имеет восьмилетний опыт пребывания в Ливане, Иордании и Египте. Получил ученую степень в области исследований арабского мира в Американском университете Бейрута. В настоящее время обучает военнослужащих вооруженных сил США, командируемых в Ближневосточный регион. Все изложенное в данной статье является исключительно его мнением.
1 Saeed M. Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over North Yemen 1962-1970, (Boulder, Westview Press: 1986), pp. 33-42. 2 R. D. McLaurin, The Battle of Zahle (Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md.: Human Engineering Laboratory, Sept. 1986), pp. 26-27. 3 Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume II: The Iran-Iraq War, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 89-98; Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 22-223, 233- 234. 4 Kenneth M. Pollack, «The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness» (Ph.d. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996), pp. 259-261 (Egypt); pp. 533-536 (Saudi Arabia); pp. 350-355 (Iraq). Syrians did not see significant combat in the 1991 Gulf war but my conversations with U.S. personnel in liaison with them indicated a high degree of paranoia and distrust toward Americans and other Arabs. 5 David Kahn, «United States Views of Germany and Japan,» Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Before the Two World Wars, ed., Ernest R. May (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 476-503. 6 Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933-1936 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970), p. 21. 7 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 18. 8 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 186-187. The German assessment from T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent J. Esposito, eds., A Short History of World War I (West Point, N.Y.: United States Military Academy, 1955), p. 8. 9 William Manchester, Winston Spencer Churchilll: The Last Lion Alone, 1932-1940 (New York: Dell Publishing, 1988), p. 613; Ernest R. May «Conclusions,» Knowing One’s Enemies, pp. 513-514. Hitler thought otherwise, however. 10 Avraham (Bren) Adan, On the Banks of the Suez (San Francisco: Presideo Press, 1980), pp. 73-86. «Thus the prevailing feeling of security, based on the assumption that the Arabs were incapable of mounting an overall war against us, distorted our view of the situation,» Moshe Dayan stated.»As for the fighting standard of the Arab soldiers, I can sum it up in one sentence: they did not run away.» Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1976), p. 510. 11 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), p. 18. 12 Ibid., p. 387 13 John Walter Jandora, Militarism in Arab Society: A Historiographical and Bibliographical Sourcebook (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1997), p. 128. 14 T. E. Lawrence, The Evolution of a Revolt (Ft. Leavenworth Kans.: CSI, 1990), p. 21.( A reprint of article originally published in the British Army Quarterly and Defense Journal, Oct. 1920.) 15 Author’s observations buttressed by such scholarly works as Eli Shouby, «The Influence of the Arabic Language on the Psychology of the Arabs,» Readings in Arab Middle Eastern Societies and Culture, ed. Abdullah M. Lutfiyya and Charles Churchill (The Hague: Mouton Co., 1970), pp. 688-703; Hisham Shirabi and Muktar Ani, «Impact of Class and Culture on Social Behavior: The Feudal-Bourgeois Family in Arab Society,» Psychological Dimensions of Near Eastern Studies, ed. L. Carl Brown and Norman Itzkowitz (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1977), pp. 240-256; Sania Hamady, Temperament and Character of the Arabs (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960), pp. 28-85; Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973), pp. 20-85. 16 Pollack, «The Influence of Arab Culture,» p. 759. 17 Samuel P. Huntington, «The Clash of Civilizations,» Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 21-49. 18 Paul M. Belbutowski, «Strategic Implications of Cultures in Conflict,» Parameters, Spring 1996, pp. 32-42. 19 Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: Harper-Collins, 1996), p. 383. 20 Saad el-Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), p. 47. 21 Jordan may be an exception here; however, most observers agree that its effectiveness has declined in the past twenty years. 22 Pollack, «The Influence of Arab Culture,» pp. 256-257. 23 H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take A Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), p. 494. 24 Khaled bin Sultan, Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the War by the Joint Forces Commander (New York: Harper-Collins, 1995), pp. 368-69. 25 Based on discussions with U.S. personnel in the area and familiar with the battle. 26 Yesoshat Harkabi, «Basic Factors in the Arab Collapse During the Six Day War,» Orbis, Fall 1967, pp. 678-679. 27 James Lunt, Hussein of Jordan, Searching for a Just and Lasting Peace: A Political Biography (New York: William Morrow, 1989), p. 99. 28 Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 197-99; Shazly, Crossing of the Suez, pp. 21, 37. 29 Samir A. Mutawi, Jordan in the 1967 War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 161. 30 James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, 3rd Ed. (New York: Harper-Collins, 1990), p. 262. 31 Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 235. 32 Hamady, Temperament and Character of the Arabs, pp. 184-193; Patai, The Arab Mind, pp.147-150. 33 Joseph Malone, «Syria and the Six-Day War,» Current Affairs Bulletin, Jan. 26, 1968, p. 80.
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